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COMPELLING THE TESTIMONY OF
POLITICAL DEVIANTS*

0.]ohn Roggef

AT the last term ·the United States Supreme Court in Ullmann
rl.. v. United States1 upheld the constitutionality of paragraph
(c) of a federal act of August 1954 which seeks to compel the testimony of communists and other political deviants. 2 Paragraph (c)
relates to witnesses before federal courts and grand juries. The
Court specifically left open the question of the validity of paragraphs (a) and (b) relating to congressional witnesses. Justice
Frankfurter delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Douglas, with
the concurrence of Justice Black, wrote a dissent.
It is our purpose to consider the background, history and terms
of this compulsory testimony act, the validity of the Court's de•This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed.
tMember, New York Bar; A.B. 1922, University of Illinois, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1931,
Harvard Law School; formerly (1939-40) United States Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; author, Our Vanishing
Civil Liberties (1949).-Ed.
1350 U.S. 422 (1956), affirming (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 760, affirming (S.D.N.Y.
1955) 128 F. Supp. 617 (Ullmann spelled with one "n" by the district court). The court
of appe~s affirmed reluctantly and with regret on the basis of the district court's opinion.
2 The act as originally proposed applied to all types of crime, but it was narrowed
before passage. Representative Kenneth B. Keating of New York, who sponsored in the
House the bill (S.16, 83d Cong.) which became law, in explaining the final form of this
bill stated: "Mr. Speaker, this bill is a very important piece of legislation to further the
struggle against the Communist conspiracy on all fronts, in the activities of investigating
committees representing the legislative arm of Government and in the prosecutive functions carried on through the executive branch. . . • This bill as now worded and now
before us exclusively applies only to investigations dealing with or prosecutions for the
crimes of treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, and violations of
certain specific statutes, all of which deal with the Communist conspiracy." 100 CoNG. REC.
13323-13324 (1954).
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., shortly after the passage of the act, in an
address at Plymouth, Massachusetts to the twentieth general congress of the General
Society of Mayflower Descendants, commented: "Another new law is the so-called Immunity Law. This was requested by the Administration in order to prevent persons
from making a sham of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Those
persons-subversives, their sympathizers or misguided persons-have been using the Fifth
Amendment in order to shield persons they knew to be part and parcel of the communist
conspiracy." Sept. 13, 1954, p. 5.
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cision, and the history, constitutionality and utility of such acts
generally. We shall be particularly concerned with the testimony
of political deviants.

Background and History of the New Federal Act
The new federal act was a part of our effort against the threat
involved in the aggressive and proselytizing course of international
communism, a movement which began to make its impact on us
from the time when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917.
Indeed, some of the Russian Bolshevik leaders were in New York
City in the early part of that year, among them both Leon Trotsky
and Nikolai I. Bukharin. Trotsky was here for two· months beginning the middle of January. Bukharin was here even longer.
He arrived in November 1916 and left after Trotsky did. Two
years later Socialist Party members held a Left vVing conference
in New York City, June 21-24, 1919, which adopted a resolution
urging all revolutionary socialists to send delegates to a forthcoming Socialist Party convention at Chicago. These delegates were
to be prepared to form a new party if the Socialist Party refused. to
reinstate all suspended and expelled members. The ·conference
also instructed its executive committee to draft and publish the
"Left Wing Manifesto" and adopted Revolutionary Age as the
Left Wing's official newspaper. The Manifesto appeare_d in_ the
July 5, 1919 Revolutionary Age and furnished the basis for "the
co!!-viction of its business manager, Benjamin Gitlow, of criminal
anarchy in New York. 3
The United States Senate began to -investigate :communist
propaganda in this country as early as 1919.4 So too did the state
of New York. Its legislature created the Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, often called the Lusk Committee, after
Senator Clayton R. Lusk, who headed it.5 Since then tjier~ have
been many investigations by many committees; state as well as
, federal, of individuals regarded as communists or communist
sympathizers and groups and organizations thought to be communist or communist dominated.
In 1938 came the House of Representative's Special Committee on Un-American Activities,6 which was continued from time
8 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
S. Doc. 62, 66th Cong., 1st sess., v.l, p. xxix, v.3.

4

5 DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC REcoRD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES

for the Republic, 1955).
6 H.R. Res. 282, 83 CONG. R.Ec. 7586 (1938)

680-681 (Fund
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to time until 1945, when it became the Committee on Un-American Activities, and a standing committee.7 Thereafter it was sometimes known by the name of one of its subsequent chairmen, John
S. Wood of Georgia, J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, Harold
H. Velde of Illinois or Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania.
The peak in congressional investigations of communists and
communist sympathizers or those thought to be such occurred in
the years 1953 and 1954. During this period Congress had not
one but a number of bodies engaged in such investigations. The
three most active ones were: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, chaired
by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin; Subcommittee on
Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, headed by
Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana; and the House Committee on Un-American Activities, headed by Representative Velde.
These three committees were often known from their respective
chairmen as the McCarthy, Jenner, and Velde Committees. The
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in turn created a task force
under the chairmanship of Senator John M. Butler of Maryland
to investigate communist infiltration into labor unions. The
House also had a Special Committee to Investigate Foundations,
chaired by B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee.8
The longest-lived of these committees, and consequently the
one that had the most to do with alleged subversives, was the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. At first those who
refused to testify or produce requested documents before this body
raised the objection that the resolution authorizing the committee's investigations was unconstitutional on the ground, among
others, that it trespassed on First Amendment freedoms. However the lower federal courts sustained the validity of the resolution, and the Supreme Court denied review.9
7 DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC REcoRD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 589, 606-607
(Fund for the Republic, 1955).
8 See id. at 523-543, 643-650, and S. Doc. 40, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 297-299, 319-326
(1955), for a summary of the work of these groups.
9 Lawson v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 49, cert. den. 839 U.S. 934
(1950); Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843
(1948), petition for rehearing den. 339 U.S. 971 (1950); United States v. Josephson, (2d
Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948), rehearing den. 333 U.S. 858 (1948).
In two of a later series of cases the Supreme Court did grant certiorari and reversed the
court below, but did so on Fifth rather than First Amendment grounds. Emspak v.
United States, 849 U.S. 190 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 54; Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 20. In these two
cases the defendants relied primarily on the First Amendment, but also tacked on the
Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Emspak case in 1953
(346 U.S. 809) and in the Quinn case in June 1954 (347 U.S. 1008).

166

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Meanwhile the Department of Justice began presenting evidence to a grand jury in the Southern District of New York, and
in July 1948 obtained an indictment against William Z. Foster,
national chairman, Eugene Dennis, general secretary, and ten other
top leaders of the American Communist Party, charging them
with a conspiracy to organize the Communist Party of the United
States as a group to teach and advocate the overthrow of our government by force and violence in violation of the Smith Act, passed
in 1940. This case went to trial in 1949 as to all but Foster, who
was severed from it because of ill health, and after nine months
resulted in a verdict of guilty as to all remaining eleven defendants.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment
of conviction in July 1950.10
With these events witnesses before grand juries and congressional committees began to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. One such witness was Patricia Blau,
before a federal grand jury in Denver. The Supreme Court sustained her claim in December 1950.11 That this claim was also
available to a witness before a congressional committee was generally recognized, and later cases repeatedly so held.12 Then the following June the Supreme Court affirmed the Dennis 13 case.
The stage was now set for numerous claims of privilege, and
they were forthcoming. With them came a mounting demand that
witnesses talk, and for an immunity act, which would confront
them with the alternative either of doing so or going to jail for
10 United

States v. Dennis, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201.
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
12 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.
155 (1955); United States v. Costello, (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 200, cert. den. 344 U.S.
874 (1952); Starkovich v. United States, (9th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 411; Jackins v. United
States, (9th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 405; United States v. Doto Goe Adonis), (2d Cir. 1953)
205 F. (2d) 416; Aiuppa v. United States, {6th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 287; Accardo v. United
States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 1021; Marcello v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196
F. (2d) 437; Poretto v. United States, {5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 392; United States v.
Fischetti, (D.C.D.C. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 796; United States v. Pechart, (N.D.Cal. 1952)
103 F. Supp. 417; United States v. Nelson, (D.C.D.C. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 215; United States
v. Licavoli, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 F. Supp. 607; United States v. DiCarlo, (N.D. Ohio 1952)
102 F. Supp. 597; United States v. Cohen, (N.D. Cal. 1952) 101 F. Supp. 906; United
States v. Jaffe, (D.C.D.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 191; United States v. Raley, (D.C.D.C. 1951)
96 F. Supp. 495; United States v. Fitzpatrick, (D.C.D.C. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 491; United
States v. Yukio Abe, (D.C. Hawaii, Jan. 16, 1951) 19 U.S. Law Week 2321; numerous
unreported decisions. See Carlson v. United States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 209 at 212;
Cohen v. United States, (9th Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 386 at 390, cert. den. 345 U.S. 951
(1953); United States v. Yukio Abe, (D.C. Hawaii 1950) 95 F. Supp. 991 at 992. Cf.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 9 A. 22 (1871); Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489
(1931); Ex parte Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164 (1938). See State v. James, 36 Wash.
(2d) 882 at 897, 221 P. (2d) 482 (1950). See note, 49 CoL. L. REv. 87 (1949).
1s Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
11
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contempt. Benjamin F. Wright, the president of Smith College,
wrote: "The central issue may be divided into two parts: Should
one who is called before such a committee testify about his present and past memberships and activities in the Communist Party?
Should a witness give the names of persons whom he knew to be
engaged in such activity? In my opinion the answer to both of
these questions is 'yes' .... " 14 A former magistrate in New York,
Morris Ploscowe, in discussing the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination, stated: "In the course of this article,
I am going to tell you how, by using a very simple, ingenious legal
device, we can effectively deal with the gangsters and Communists
who are trying to destroy our society while hiding behind this
shield which has been furnished them by the Constitution itself. "111 His remedy was of course an immunity statute. In October
1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., in an address before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., declared, "Subversives and criminals have not been slow to rely upon this provision which was written into our Constitution to protect lawabiding citizens against tyranny and despotism"; and followed by
asking, "Can we afford to permit these wrongdoers to destroy the
institutions of freedom by hiding behind the shield of this constitutional privilege?"16 He concluded his address with the announcement that the Department of Justice would seek an immunity
statute at the forthcoming session of Congress. President Eisenhower in his State-of-the-Union message in January 1954 referred
to the Attorney General's proposed immunity bill.17
After the Supreme Court's decision in the Blau case various
immunity bills were introduced in Congress. The first one was
by Senator Pat McCarren of Nevada, in May 1951, S. 1570, 82d
Congress.18 It authorized a congressional committee by a twothir.ds vote, including at least one member of the minority party,
14 "Should Teachers Testify," SAT. REv., Sept. 26, 1953, pp. 22, 23.
to Make Gangsters Talk," THIS WEEK MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 1953, pp. 7, 34-35.
See Dowling, "I Stand on the Fifth Amendment," N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1953, §6, p. IO.
16 "Remedy for Abuse of Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," Oct.
14, J.953, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1953, p. 1:5. He repeated the substance of this speech in
an address before the Law Club of Chicago, Nov. 6, 1953. "Immunity from Prosecution
Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," reprinted in full in U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD
REPORT, Dec. 25, 1953, pp. 90-95, and in 28 TULANE L. REv. I (1953); 14 FED. B.J. 91 (1954).
REPORT, Dec. 25, 1953, pp. 90-95. In the latter speech he stated that "subversives and
In the latter speech he stated that "subversives and criminals have been quick to rely"
upon their privilege.
17 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1954, p. 10:3.
18 97 CoNc. REc. 5972. It was reported favorably by the Committee on the Judiciary.
S. Rep. 717, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951).
lli "How
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to grant immunity to a witness. In the same session the Special
Committee . to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, frequently known as the Kefauver Committee, after its
chairman, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, proposed a bill,
S. 1747, to vest immunity powers in the attorney general in any
proceeding before a federal court or grand jury,19 and endorsed
not only its own bill but also that of Senator McCarran.20 So too
did the American Bar Association Commission on Organized
Crime.21 Neither bill passed, but new bills were introduced in
1953. Senator McCarran's bill was S. 16, 83d Congress, and the
Kefauver Committee's bill was S. 565. The Department of Justice,
because it was charged with the prosecution of offenses, and aware
of the fact that under the law as it then stood all grants of immunity from prosecution rested solely with agents of the executive branch of government, objected to S. 16 on the ground that
it gave no participation to the attorney general. Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers wrote to Senator William Langer,
then Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "This
Department is disturbed, however, by the failure of the bill to
provide that the Attorney General shall participate in the granting
of any immunity to a witness before a congressional committee
or before either House of Congress. The Attorney General is the
chief legal officer of the Government of the United States. . . .Not
only must this responsibility be coupled with an authority adequate to permit its discharge, but in addition it would seem inadvisable for others to be cloaked with an authority capable of preventing the Attorney General from fully performing his duty." 22
Nevertheless S. 16 passed the Senate in 1953,23 but not the House.
In January 1954. Representative Kenneth B. Keating of New
York introduced an immunity bill, H.R. 6899, which had the endorsement of the attorney general.24 This bill applied not only
to witnesses before congressional committees or before either
House, but also before federal courts or grand juries. The ultimate
decision to grant immunity rested in all instances with'the attorne,y
general. Yet other immunity bills were introduced in the House,
both in 1953 and 1954.215 Senator McCarran objecte~ to H.R. 6899
· 10 97 CoNG.

20 S.

REc. 7015 (1951).
Rep. 725, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 94-95 (1951).

•21REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, vol.

22 S. Rep. 153, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 15
2s 99 CONG. REc. 8357 (1953).
24 100 CONG. REc. 13323 (1954).
26 H.R. 2737, H.R. 4489, H.R. 6948.

(1953).

1, pp. 59-60 (1952).
·
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on the ground that "any such grant of a veto power to the Attorney
General ... would be a violation of the separation of powers."26
Both of Senator McCarran's bills, S. 1570, 82d Congress and S. 16,
83d Congress, which related only to witnesses before congressional
committees, provided for a grant of immunity without the approval of any outside agency. After a long tug of war between
Senator McCarran and Attorney General Brownell_ a compromise
was finally arrived at pursuant to which S. 16 was revised to provide for three participants in grants of immunity. Two of the
participants were to be the attorney general and a federal district
court. In the case of congressional witnesses the third hand was to
be Congress or one of its committees; and in the case of other
witnesses, a federal district attorney. The court was to be the final
arbiter in all instances. This revision occurred in the House. The
House Report on S. 16 in its revised form stated: "In all cases
where the bill authorizes a grant of immunity there are at least
two other independent but interested parties who must concur
in the grant of immunity in order to meet the requirements of the
bill." 27 This statement is not quite accurate, for in the case of
congressional witnesses, if the attorney general does not concur,
the Congress or one of its committees may nevertheless proceed
to grant immunity with the approval of the appropriate federal
district court.
On August 4, 1954 the House passed this revision of S. 16 by a
vote of 294 to 55.28 A week later the Senate concurred in the House
amendments with but a single dissenting voice, that of Senator
Herbert H. Lehman of New York, and even his opposition to the
passage of the measure was limited "to the manner in which it
has been brought up." 29 On August 20, 1954 the president approved it.so
The same day Congressman Keating declared: "This is the
most important and effective piece of legislation dealing with the
Communist conspiracy that has been enacted at this session. It
will loosen the tongues of some reluctant witnesses and prevent
higher-ups from escaping punishment for lack of evidence. Armed
with this ·weapon, our law enforcement officials should be greatly
fortified in their continuing war against our internal enemies."81
100 CoNc. R.Ec. 13997 (1954).
Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 8 (1954).
28 100 CONG. R.Ec. 13333 (1954).
29 Id. at 13998.
• so 18 u.s.c. (Supp. m, 1956) §3486.
Sl N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1954, p. 6:1.
26

27 H.R.
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A few days later President Eisenhower explained: "Last week I
signed a bill granting immunity from prosecution to certain suspected persons in order to aid in obtaining the conviction of subversives. Investigation and prosecution of crimes involving national security have been seriously hampered by witnesses who
have invoked the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amendment. This act provides a new
means of breaking through the secrecy which is characteristic of
traitors, spies and saboteurs. " 32
As finally passed the new federal immunity act applies to witnesses before either House of Congress, congressional committees,
and federal courts and grand juries, and to investigations into treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy and the
overthrow of the government by force or violence. Court approval
must be secured in every instance. For an offer of immunity to a
congressional witness there must be an affirmative vote of a majority of the members present if the witness is before either House,
and of two-thirds of the members of the full committee if he is
before a committee. The attorney general must be notified when
either House or any congressional committee proposes to grant
immunity, and also of any application for court approval of the
proposed grant. The immunity granted is freedom from prosecution for or subjection to "any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is
so compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence," except prosecution
for "perjury or contempt while giving testimony or producing evidence."
In form, the new immunity act is an amendment of the first
federal immunity statute, passed in 1857,33 and amended m
1862.34 In fact it w-as almost a complete substitution.

Approval of Proposed Immunity Grants
A Nonjudicial Function
The most serious legal question which the federal act raises is
this: does it seek to confer on federal courts a nonjudicial function
in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution? Immunity
acts involve the determination of a policy question: is it desirable
32 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1954, p. 16:3.
33 11 Stat. 155, 156, §2 (1857).
M 12 Stat. 333 (1862). It became successively

§634, and 18 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §3486.

Rev. Stat. §859 (1875), 28 U.S.C. (1940)
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in a particular instance to grant an offender freedom from prosecution in order to confront him with the choice either of telling what
he knows or going to jail? In the past such determinations have
been made almost exclusively by agents of the executive branch of
government in connection with the investigation and prosecution
of offenses. Until the act of August 1954 the only federal exception
was the act of 1857 in its broad form, an exception which lasted
but five years.
Does the act of August 1954 require federal courts to participate
in the determination of the advisability of proposed grants of immunity? It would seem so. Clearly this is the case in the instance
of such a proposed grant to a witness before one of the Houses of
Congress or a congressional committee, for here paragraph (b)
of the act speci~cally calls for the "approval" of a federal district
court. Congress intended no difference in result between this
paragraph and the following paragraph (c), relating to a witness
before a federal court or grand jury, despite the fact that the latter
paragraph refers only to an "order" of a federal district court.
Originally neither Congressman Keating's bill, H.R. 6899, nor
Senator McCarran's bill, S. 16, contained any provision for court
approval. Then S. 16 was revised in the House to provide for
court approval in all instances, or at least so Congress thought.
The House Report on S. 16 in its revised form, after summarizing
paragraphs (a)- (c), specifically states: "In all cases where the bill
authorizes a grant of immunity after privilege has been claimed,
there are at least two other independent but interested parties
who must concur in the grant of immunity in order to meet the
requirements of the bill."35 District Judge Weinfeld, before
whom the Ullmann case arose, tried to escape from the effect of
this language by suggesting that the phrase "independent but interested parties" referred, in the case of paragraph (c), to a district attorney and the attorney general.36 But the language is not
"two independent but interested parties"; it is "two other independent but interested parties." The words "two other" can
refer only, in the case of paragraph (c), to a district judge as well
as the attorney general.
Moreover, Congressman Keating, a member of the Judiciary
Committee of the House, and the measure's leading sponsor in
that body, specifically took the position that so far as court approval
a5

36

H. R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1954).
128 F. Supp. 617 at 626 (1955).
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was concerned there was no difference between paragraphs (b)
and (c). In debate on the measure he stated:
". . . it does not leave the final determination as to the
granting of immunity in either the hands of the investigating
-committee or the Attorney General, but rather the court. . . _.
"As to (a), proceedings before a congressional committee,
it provides that if a congressional committee or either House
of Congress itself concludes that it is desirable to grant immunity to some witness in order to obtain evidence regarding
some higher up or someone else, then the congressional committee shall give notice to the Attorney General of an application to a court and the court shall be the final arbiter as to
whether or not immunity should be granted. The Attorney
General can appear in court and say: 'I agree with the committee,' or he can appear there and say, 'I disagree with the
committee. This is a case where immunity should not be
- granted,' and the court will have the final word in the matter.
"Section (c) deals with proceedings ·before a court or
grand jury. In that case it says that if the United States
attorney in a particular area has a prosecution before him and
feels that immunity should be granted to some prospective
witness, he shall first get the approval of the Attorney General
to the granting of that immunity and then shall appeal to the
court and the court will pass on the question, and if convinced of the propriety, issue the order for immunity." 37
After explaining that a grant of immunity was "really a sort of
bargaining process," and pointing out that a prosecutor or a congressional committee might sometimes get out-traded, -Congressman Keating went on to maize plain that courts were to be a part
of this process in every instance of a proposed grant of immunity
under the new act:
"The _feature of the bill before us which I especially commend to your favorable attention-is intended to talze care
9f thi~ problem of blind bargaining. It requires, in the case
of congressional investigations, virtual agreement between all
three branches of the Government-legislative, executive, and
judicial-before an effective grant of immunity is conferred.
In court proceedings it requires approval of both the prosecutor and the court."38
37 100 CONG. REc.
38 Id. at 13324.

13323 (1954).
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Senator McCarran, who introduced S. 16, and was the bill's
leading sponsor in the Senate, took the same position in debate
there that Congressman Keating had taken in the House.39
Before the Ullmann case arose, the Attorney General, too, took
the same position as Congressman Keating. In a speech at
Plymouth, Massachusetts to the twentieth general congress of the
General Society of Mayflower Descendants he said that immunity
"will be granted by a Federal District Judge, after advice from
the Attorney General, upon petition of a United States Attorney
or a representative of Congress."40
Judge Weinfeld, after questioning the weight to be given to
remarks made in general debate by individual members of a reporting committee in determining congressional intent,41 referred
to a statement by Congressman Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania,
who was also a member of the House Judiciary Committee, and
commented that he "took a quite different view" from Congressman Keating. Congressman Walter did say at one point that
"before a person can be granted immunity the court is called upon
to act on the question of the materiality and the germaneness of
the matter under inquiry"; 42 but a few moments later, in response
to Representative Jacob K. Javits of New York, who remarked,
" ... The court would not I believe inquire into the advisability
or lack of it in giving an immunity bath," stated: "After all, when
it comes to the question of the wisdom, I just think that is a question of materiality."43 Either he did not distinguish between the
question of the wisdom of a proposed grant of immunity and
questions of materiality and pertinency, or he equated all of them.
Then this interchange took place:
"MR. J AVITS. The Congress will have decided that [ materiality] and the court will just rely upon the decision made
by the committee or the House?
"MR. WALTER. I do not think so. I think this goes much
further than that." 44
80 100 CONG. REc. 13997-13998
40 Sept. 13, 1954, p. 5.

(1954).

41 He said in a footnote: "Whether or not statements made during general debate
by individual members of the reporting committee are sufficient to show a congressional
intent may be open to question. See Jackson, J., concurring in Schwegmann Brothers
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395. . .; Note, A Re-evaluation of the Use of
Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 CoL. L. REv. 125." 128 F. Supp. 616 at 627,
n. 28.
42 100 CONG. REc. 13325 (1954).
43 Ibid. Congressman Javits was not a member of the House Judiciary Committee.
He was one of the 55 who voted against the measure. 100 CoNG. REc. 13333 (1954).
-!4 Id. at 13325.
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Thus he ended up taking the same position as Congressman
Keating on the role of the courts: district judges had to pass upon
the advisability of proposed grants of immunity. In taking this
position he did not distinguish between congressional witnesses
and witnesses before federal courts or grand juries.
But the Court in the Ullmann case, as had Judge Weinfeld,
reduced the role of a federal court under paragraph (c), relating
to a witness before.a federal court or grand jury, simply to that of
ascertaining whether certain formal requirements had been met
and if so ordering a witness to testify or produce evidence. Judge
Weinfeld stressed the fact that paragraph (b) required the "approval" of a federal district court whereas the following paragraph
·(c) provided only for the "order" of such a court.45 However,
if the provision of paragraph (c) that the district attorney "shall
make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed
to testify or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this
section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not be
excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other
evidence," upon which Judge Weinfeld strongly relied, means no
more than the Court and he said it did, then it becomes wholly
unnecessary. It will require courts to do no more than what they
have always done without it. Courts would have continued to do
precisely this without any such provision.
The Court, and Judge Weinfeld, relied on Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson.46 But ~hat case involved the application of compulsion to a witness before an administrative body,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and this body did not have
power to enforce its own subpoena. It had to rely for this purpose
on a grant of power to a federal court. Such a court, however,
needs no grant of power to apply compulsion to a witness before
it or a grand jury under its jurisdiction. It has this power inherently.
In the Brimson case the court truly had nothing to do with the
determination of the question whether a subpoena ought to issue.
This was left solely with the commission. Equating the Ullmann
case with this case means that the quoted portion of paragraph (c)
was an embellishment which served no other purpose than that
of deceiving Congress.
Professor Dixon has shown that at least paragraphs (a) and (b)
45 128 F. Supp. 616 at 624-625 (1955).
46154 U.S. 447 (1894).
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seek to impose on federal courts a nonjudicial function contrary
to our constitutional requirements for the separation of governmental powers.47 Justice Jackson would have been of the same
mind. In his The Supreme Court in the American System of
Government, published posthumously, he described the judicial
function, and indicated his doubts as to the validity of legislation
of the type which paragraphs (a) and (b) contain:
"But perhaps the most significant and least comprehended
limitation upon the judicial power is that this power extends
only to cases and controversies. We know that this restriction
was deliberate, for it was proposed in the Convention that the
Supreme Court be made a part of a Council of Revision with
a kind of veto power, and this was rejected.
"The result of the limitation is that the Court's only power
is to decide lawsuits between adversary litigants with real
interests at stake, and its only method of proceeding is by the
conventional judicial, as distinguished from legislative or administrative, process. This precludes the rendering of advisory opinions even at the request of the nation's President
and every form of pronouncement on abstract, contingent, or
hypothetical issues. It prevents acceptance for judicial settlement of issues in which the interests and questions involved
are political in character. It also precludes imposition on
federal constitutional courts of nonjudicial duties. Recent
trends to empower judges to grant or deny wiretapping rights
to a prosecutor or to approve a waiver of prosecution in order
to force a witness to give self-incriminating testimony raise
interesting and dubious questions. A federal court can perform but one function-that of deciding litigations-and can
proceed in no manner except by the judicial process."48
The Court in the Ullmann case expressly left open the question
whether paragraphs (a) and (b) attempt to confer on federal
courts a nonjudicial function. 49 Judge Weinfeld went a bit farther.
After quoting these words, "Such an order may be issued by a
United States district court judge," from paragraph (a), and these
words, "without first having notified the Attorney General of the
United States of such action and thereafter having secured the
approval of the United States district court for the district wherein
47 Dixon, "The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes,"
23 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 501, 627 (1955). See also comment, 22 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 657 (1955).
48 At 11-12 (1955).
49 350 U.S. 422 at 431-432 (1956) ("We are concerned here only with § (c) and
therefore need not pass on this question with respect to §§ (a) and (b) of the Act'').
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such inquiry is being held," from paragraph (c), and italicizing
the words "may" and "approval," he continued: "The language
in these sections of the act purports to vest discretion in the court
and specifically requires its approval of any grant of immunity."110
In reaching its conclusions as to paragraph (c) the Court, as
had Judge Weinfeld, assumed that paragraphs (a) and (c) were
separable from it without discussing the question. But there
would seem to be great doubt about this, for Congress would not
have passed one part without the other.
The new federal act consists of but two sections, and of these,
one deals with the title. The act thus reduces itself to a single
section. It contains no separability clause. Furthermore, in view
of the history of the new act and the long struggle between
Congress and the attorney general over its form, it is clear that
Congress would not have been satisfied with paragraph (c), which
the attorney general wanted, if this paragraph had not been accompanied by paragraphs (a) and (b), which Congress wanted.
Whether the invalid parts of an act are separable from the valid
ones is a question of legislative intent.111 Because of the fact that
many modem statutes contain a separability clause, the absence
of such a clause results in the strict application today of a presumption of indivisibility.52 The leading federal case on separability and separability clauses is Carter v. Carter Coal Co.113 That
case involved a separability clause which read: "If any provision
of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby." After quoting it the Court said: "In the
absence of such a provision, the presumption is that the legislature
intends an act to be effective as an entirety-that is to say, the rule
is against the mutilation of a statute; and if any provision be unrm 128 F. Supp. 616 at 624 (1955).
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Utah Power &: Light Co. v. Pfost,
286 U.S. 165 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
52 See Stern, "Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court," 51 HARv.
L. REv. 76, 121 (1937). In Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, (E.D. S.C. 1948) 79
F. Supp. 62, revd. 336 U.S. 220 (1949), the majority of a three-judge statutory court
stated (at 65-66): "In view of the modern form of legislative drafting, the omission of
such a provision evidences clearly the legislative intent that this statute must stand or
fall as a whole." State cases to this effect are Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116,
257 S.W. (2d) 16 (1953); Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125
S.W. (2d) 151 (1939); Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 181 S.W. (2d) 570 (1944).
53 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
111
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constitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provisions
fall with it. " 54
A modern statute without a separability clause is not necessarily indivisible. However, the absence of such a clause requires
the proponents of divisibility to overcome a strong presumption
against them. Even without the benefit of any presumption one
can suggest that in the case of the new federal act it affirmatively
appears that Congress would not have passed paragraph (c) without paragraphs (a) and (b). All three paragraphs should fall
together.

Necessity of Protection Against the Danger of State Prosecution
Another problem which the federal act of August 1954 presents
involves the question of whether it should, does and can protect
against the substantial danger of state prosecutions in the area
which it covers. The Court in the Ullmann case answered the last
two questions in the affirmative. Judge Weinfeld did likewise,
but he also answered the first question in the negative.
In concluding that the federal act did, and constitutionally
could, protect against state prosecutions it would seem that no
one gave sufficient consideration to several factors. To begin with,
the federal act became a part of the federal criminal code. It was
in the form of an amendment of one of the sections of this code.
Another section of the same title expressly provides: "Nothing in
this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of
the courts of the several States under the laws thereof."CHS This
provision, as the dissent in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,56 decided a
week after the Ullmann case, pointed out, is but a recognition of
the fact that under our federal system the prosecution of offenses
is committed primarily to the states: "It recognizes the fact that
maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the states." 57
In another recent case, Rochin v. California,58 Justice Frankfurter
speaking for the Court stated: "In our federal system the administration of criminal justice is predominantly committed to the care
of the states. The power to define crimes belongs to Congress
Mld. at 312.
u.s.c. (1952) §3231.
56 350 U.S. 497 (1956), affirming 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), revei:sing 172
Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. (2d) 431 (1952).
57 350 U.S. 497 at 519 (1956). Justice Reed wrote the dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Burton and Minton joined.
118 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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only as an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited
grant of legislative powers."59 But if the new federal act protects
against state prosecutions then the jurisdiction of state courts· will
be impaired.60 No one discussed this point.
In the second place, no one gave sufficient weight to the significant difference in wording in the federal act between the prohibition against prosecution and that against the use of testimony
given. In the former case the act simply says that "no such witness
shall be prosecuted"; but in the latter case it provides that no
testimony which a witness is compelled to give shall be used as
evidence "in any criminal proceeding . . . against him in any
court." Such a difference in language has been differently treated
by the Supreme Court. In Ensign v. Pennsylvania,61 which involved an immunity provision (in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898)
.simply prohibiting the use of testimony compelled from a bankrupt against him "in any criminal proceeding," the Court left
open the question whether this prohibition included state court
proceedings. But in Adams v. Maryland, 62 which involved the
very prohibition against the use of c~mpelled testimony "in any
court" 63 that we are here considering, the Court held that the
prohibition included state courts. Also, Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion was careful to point out that the prohibition
59 Id. at 168. Or as Justice Douglas put it for the Court in Jerome v. United States,
318 l,J.S. IOI at .104, 105 (1943): " ••. Since there is no common law offense against the
United States (United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32; United States v. Gradwell, 243
U.S. 476, 485), the administration of criminal justice under our federal system has
rested with the states, except as criminal offenses have been explicitly prescribed by
Congress..••" See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 at 412, 413 (1945) ("Apart from
permitting Congress to use criminal sanctions as means for carrying into execution powers
granted to it, the Constitution left the domain of criminal justice to the States.") (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). The Court adverted to this point in Marcello
v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437 at 443, in sustaining a claim of privilege before a subcommittee of the Kefauver Committee, although the claim was really
based on a fear of state prosecution: "It must be remembered also that, in our federal
system, the administration of criminal justice rests preponderantly with the states."
60 Cf. Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319 (1903); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. (2d) 756, 264
P. (2d) 513 (1953); Nastasi v. Aderhold, 201 Ga. 237, 39 S.E. (2d) 403 (1946); People
v. Fury, 279 N.Y. 433, 18 N.E. (2d) 650 (1939); People v. Welch, 141 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E.
1128 (1894).
61227 U.S. 592 (1913). Various state cases held that testimony of a bankrupt given
under this immunity provision was inadmissiblt: in a state court criminal proceeding
:against him. Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 S. 135 (1914); People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 17,
159 N.W. 299 (1916); People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 476 at 488, 160 N.W. 467 (1916); People
-v. Donnenfeld, 198 App. Div. 918, 189 N.Y.S. 951 (1921), affd. without opinion, 233 N.Y•
.526, 135 N.E. 903 (1922); People v. Elliott, 123 Misc. 602, 206 N.Y.S. 54 (1924).
. 62 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
63 This prohibition was in 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3486 as it stood before it was amended
by •the new federal act, and was retained.
··
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against the use of compelled testimony left "Maryland with complete freedom to prosecute." 64 .
Moreover, the difference in language between the two types of
prohibition represents a difference in intent on the part of Congress. In the prohibition against use of compelled testimony
Congress specified "in any court," with the express intent of including state courts; but in the prohibition against prosecution
Congress omitted these words, and did so with the deliberate intent
of leaving this prohibition ambiguous. The House Report on
S.16, in discussing the power of Congress to prohibit state prosecution, points out:
"The answer to the·precise question is not too clear....
In any event the question can only be resolved by a decision
of the Supreme Court. Even though the power of Congress
to prohibit a subsequent State prosecution is doubtful, such
a constitutional question should not prevent the enactment
of the recommended bill. The language of the amendment
that 'no such witness shall be prosecuted. . . ', is sufficiently
broad to ban a subsequent State prosecution if it be determined that the Congress has the constitutional power to do
so. In addition, the amendment recommended provides the
additional protection-as set forth in the Adams case, by outlawing the subsequent use of the compelled testimony in any
criminal proceeding-State or Federal." 65
In other words what Congress, almost in express language asked
the Supreme Court to do on the point of the prohibition of state
prosecution was to legislate: if such a prohibition was constitutional the Court was to rule that it was included; if not, the Court
was to rule otherwise.- The Court should have left the ambiguous
prohibition against prosecution just as ineffective as Congress
made it.
That the prohibition in the new act against prosecution was
ambiguous was pointed out on the floor of the House during the
debate on the measure. Congressman Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut in arguing against S.16 stated: "For example, from a
reading of it, no one can tell whether the immunity granted extends to prosecutions in State courts and this is but one of the
obscurities in the legislation."66 Nevertheless, Congress took no
347 U.S. 179 at 185 (1954).
H.R. R~p. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 7 (1954).
66 10() CoNG. R.Ec. 13328 (1954).
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step to meet this objection, which it could easily have done by
adding the words "in any court": it left the prohibition against
prosecution ambiguous.
However, both the Court and the district judge read the
House Report on S.16 as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to prohibit state prosecution.67 According to the district
judge such an intent "was expressly stated by the House Committee."68 It is submitted that the judge is mistaken, and that the
quoted portion from the House Report demonstrates this.
The Court pointed out that the prohibition against prosecution in the new federal act was substantially the same as that in
the act of 1893,69 sustained in Brown v. Walker. 70 While it is true
that the Court in that case commented that the act of 1893 "contains no suggestion that it is to be applied only to the Federal
courts," the Court in the next paragraph went on to say that the
possibility of prosecution by another sovereignty "is not a real and
probable danger." 71
In the third place, no one gave sufficient attention to the area
covered by the new federal act, the area of treason, sedition, subversion and sabotage, and the mass of state and local legislation
in this area. During the past fifty years the states have had more
legislation in this area than the federal government; and likewise,
until the Smith Act cases, which only began in 1948, more prosecutions.72
In 1902, the year after Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist, assassinated President McKinley, New York passed a criminal anarchy
act. Fourteen other states followed in its lead. Immediately after
World War I some seventeen states adopted criminal syndicalism
laws. In a single year, 1919, twenty-six states, more than half,
passed laws against the display of red flags.
Today all of the states either in their Constitutions or statutes,
67 350
68 128

U.S. 422 at 435 (1956); 128 F. Supp. 617 at 623, 624 (1955).
F. Supp. 617 at 624 (1955).
69 350 U.S. 422 at 434 (1956).
70 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
71 Id. at 607, 608.
72 Four excellent books containing treatments of this field are CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 285-438 (1948); EMERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 376-600 (1952); THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (Gellhorn ed. 1952):
DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 241-487, 669-686
(Fund for the Republic, 1955). The work edited by Gellhorn contains presentations by
six persons, Barrett, Harsha, Prendergast, Mowitz, Chamberlain and Countryman, of the
activities against subversion in six states, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New
York and Washington.
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and often in both, have provisions defining treason. Thirty-three
states prohibit misprision of treason. Nineteen states and Hawaii
have criminal anarchy statutes; of these states four also make it
a crime knowingly to attend an assemblage of persons defined as
criminal anarchists, or to permit an assemblage of such persons
on one's premises. Twenty jurisdictions, including Alaska and
Hawaii, have statutes on criminal syndicalism; of which statutes
fourteen also forbid participation in meetings and permitting
such meetings on one's premises. Thirty-five states have laws prohibiting the display of certain types of flags and other emblems.
Thirty-three jurisdictions, including Alaska and Hawaii, have
sedition statutes. Twenty-eight states have provisions against insurrection and rebellion. Thirty-two jurisdictions, including
Alaska and Hawaii, have some form of statute dealing with sabotage. Fifteen jurisdictions, including Hawaii, have on their books,
often with some variations or modifications, the Model Sabotage
Prevention Act, which was drafted in 1941 after the Federal-State
Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense,
held under the auspices of the Department of Justice, the Interstate Commission on Crime, the National Association of Attorneys
General, the Governors' Conference, and the Council of State
Governments. In addition, various of the states have registration
statutes, provisions for loyalty oaths, teachers' loyalty statutes, and
laws excluding communists and subversives from elective office,
from public office, and from state employment.73
In 1949 Maryland enacted a comprehensive and drastic statute against subversion, the Ober Law, formally designated as the
Subversive Activities Act of 1949, and New York passed an act for
further insuring the loyalty of its teachers, the Feinberg Law,
which provided for the preparation of a black list of organizations.
During the next few years eight states, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington, followed Maryland's lead and put on their statute books acts
modeled in substantial parts in the Ober Law.74 Ten states,
73 These acts are listed in DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 241-451 (Fund for the Republic, 1955), and THE STATES AND SUBVERSION,
App. B., 414-440 (Gellhorn ed. 1952).
74 Fla. Stat. (1955) §§876.22 to 876.31; Ga. Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1955) §§26-90la
to 26-914a; La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §§14.366 to 14.380; Miss. Code (Supp. 1954)
§§4046-01 to 4064-12; N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §§588.l to 588.16 and (Supp. 1955) §§588.3-a,
588.3-b; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 1956) §§2921.21 to 2921.27; Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, Supp. 1955) tit. 65, §§211 to 225; Wash. Rev. Code (1951; Supp. July 1953)
§§9.81.010 to 9.81.130.
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Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Louisiana, Michigan,
Montana, New Mexico, South Carolina and Texas passed registration acts or elaborated existing ones.75 The acts of Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico and Texas
referred specifically to the Communist Party. The Delaware
statute requires every communist or front member who resides
in or passes through the state to register. Four states, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Texas, passed laws which outlawed the Communist Party by name.76
Beginning in 1950 a hundred or more cities and counties
across the country adopted measures against subversion. The list
included: Bessemer and Birmingham, Alabama; Los Angeles,
Oakland and Redondo Beach, California; Jacksonville and Miami,Florida; Atlanta and Macon, Georgia; Indianapolis and Terre
Haute, Indiana; Cumberland, Maryland; Detroit and Saginaw,
Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Omaha, Nebraska; Jersey
City, New Jersey; New Rochelle, New York; Cincinnati, Columbus and Lorain, Ohio; Erie, Lancaster, McKeesport and York,
Pennsylvania; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Tacoma and Seattle,
Washington. Los Angeles, California and New Rochelle, New
York by ordinance required registration with the police of any
member of a "communist organization" who "resides in, is employed in, has a regular place of business in, or who regularly
enters or travels through any part" of the city. Birmingham,
Alabama by ordinance imposed a fine and imprisonment for each
day that a known communist remained in the city. A Jacksonville,
Florida ordinance made it unlawful for any Communist Party
member to be within the city limits during the period of hostilities in Korea. A Seattle, Washington ordinance made it unlawful
for any subversive organization to rent or use the Civic Auditorium. Various ordinances of other cities prohibited advocacy,
required the registration of communists and subversives, forbade
75 Ala. Code (Supp. 1955) tit. 14, §§97 (I) to 97 (8); Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955)
§§41-4125 to 41-4127; Cal. Corp. Code (Deering, 1953) §§35000 to 35302; Del. Code Ann.
(Supp. 1954) tit. 20, §§3501 to 3503; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) §§14-358 to 14-365;
Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1954) §§752.321 to 752.332; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp.
1955) §§94-4411 to 94-4427; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§4-15-1 to 4-15-3; S.C. Code (1952)
§§16-581 to 16-589; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1956) §§6889-3, 3A.
76 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1956) §§10-5201 to 10-5209; Mass. Ann. Laws (1956) c.
264, §§16 to 23; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1955) tit. 18, §3811; Tex. Civ. Stat.
(Vernon, Supp. 1956) §6889-3A. Sections 16A and 17 of the Massachusetts act provide:
"The Communist Party is hereby declared to be a subversive organization" and "A sub•
versive organization is hereby declared to be unlawful."
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the use of certain types of flags, and provided for loyalty oaths.
Many cities prescribed loyalty oaths for their employees. Los
Angeles and Detroit set up administrative procedures for determining the loyalty of their employees.77
Various of the states, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,
Montana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Washington, and Hawaii, have set up committees or
commissions to investigate un-American activities. Of these bodies
the most active have been the Tenney Committee in California;
the Broyles Commission in Illinois; the Lusk (1919-20) and RappCoudert Committees in New York; and the Canwell Committee
in the state of Washington.78
Not only have the states had all manner of measures in the
area covered by the new federal act, but they have also brought
many prosecutions under various of the statutes to which reference has been made. Most of these prosecutions of course did not
go to reviewing courts. Of the few that did, a still smaller number
reached the United States Supreme Court. There, although a
number of these statutes were invalidated,79 a number of others
were sustained. While it is true that in the most recent decision,
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 80 the Court ruled against the validity of
a Pennsylvania sedition law, and cast doubt on such laws of other
states, on the ground that the federal Smith Act pre-empted the
field, the Court was careful to confine its ruling to that field. The
prosecution in that case was for sedition, not against Pennsylvania.
but against the United States. Chief Justice Warren writing for
the Court took pains to point out the boundaries of the opinion:
". . . Neither does it limit the right of the state to protect itself
at any time against sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds.
77 For a description of these measures see EMERSON AND HABER, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 599 (1952); THE STATES AND SUBVERSION 382-383 (Ge1Ihom
ed. 1952). Many of these ordinances are reproduced in DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF
COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 455-488 (Fund for The Republic, 1955).
78 The activities of these bodies were described by Barrett, Harsha, Chamberlain,
and Countryman in THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (Ge1Ihorn ed. 1952).
79 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (Pennsylvania sedition act); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Oklahoma statute prescribing loyalty oath for state
officers and employees); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Georgia statute against
insurrection as applied); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (Oregon criminal syndicalism law as applied); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (California red
flag law); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (Kansas criminal syndicalism statute as
applied).
so 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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Nor does it prevent the state from prosecuting where the same
act constitutes both a Federal offense and a state offense under
the police power. . . . "81
In earlier cases the Court sustained the validity of various state
statutes dealing with subversion. It upheld the constitutionality of
three of New York's statutes, two of them in prosecutions: the
criminal anarchy act of 1902 in Gitlow v. New Y ork;82 its registration act in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman;83 and the
Feinberg Law in Adler v. Board of Education. 84 The Court upheld a Minnesota sedition act in a criminal prosecution in Gilbert
v. Minnesota; 85 and the California criminal syndicalism act in
criminal prosecutions in Whitney v. California86 and Burns v.
United States.81 The Court, in Gamer v. Board of Public Works, 88
sustained the validity of the oath requirements which Los Angeles
prescribed by ordinance for its office holders and employees; and,
in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,89 on a restricted interpretation of what the law required, held valid an oath provision of
Maryland's Ober Law.
Not only do the states have a multitude of measures against
subversion and not only have there been many prosecutions under
these provisions, but also the states are going to insist on what
they deem their rights and powers to proceed with further such
prosecutions. Indeed, of late, state officials have increasingly urged
that the states play an even greater role than heretofore in the
fight against subversion. Moreover, Attorney General Brownell
has encouraged state action in this field.
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 90 when Pennsylvania petitioned
the federal Supreme Court for certiorari, four states, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Texas, filed briefs as amid
curiae supporting the petitioner; and the attorneys general of
twenty-four states, including Massachusetts, joined in the brief of
81 Id.
82268
113 278
84 342
85 254
86 274
87 274
88 341
89 341
90 350

at 500.

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U .s.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

652 (1925).
63 (1928).
485 (1952).
325 (1920).
357 (1927).
328 (1927).
716 (1951).
56 (1951).
497 (1956).
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the state of New Hampshire. 91 The United States too, after the
Court's invitation to the solicitor general for the views of the
federal government, filed a brief amicus curiae in which it supported the validity of Pennsylvania's sedition law. In this brief
the United States, after pointing out that,
" ... Forty-two states plus Alaska and Hawaii have statutes
which prohibit advocacy of the violent overthrow of established government. Most of these statutes have been in existence for many years ....
". . . Every state has made provisions for treason either in
its constitution or statutes, often in both ....
" ... As of January 1955, some 30 states plus Alaska and
Hawaii had sedition laws on their statute books, and 12 others
had either criminal syndicalism or criminal anarchy statutes
or both, making a total of 42 states plus Alaska and Hawaii
which had criminal legislation in this general field .... " 92
took the position:
". . . Moreover the problem of subversion, as we think
Congress recognized, is of such magnitude as to invite federal-state cooperation in the enforcement of their respective
sedition laws. Thus the Attorney General of the United
States recently informed the attorneys general of the several
states in this connection that a full measure of federal-state
cooperation would be in the public interest."93
The role of the states in the fight against subversion was also
one of the main topics of discussion at the 1954 and 1955 conferences of the National Association of Attorneys General, an
association comprised of the attorneys general of all the states and
. . territories. At the 1954 conference Attorney General Louis C.
Wyman of New Hampshire asserted that the states had a place
in the fight against subversion alongside the federal government.94
He said that a state investigation, properly conducted would
supplement the work of the F .B.I. and other federal agencies
91348 U.S. 814 (1954). The states were Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and "Wisconsin.
92 Brief, pp. 5, 15, 22.
93 Brief, p. 31.
94For an account of this session see N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1954, p. 16:4-6.
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engaged in the .enforcement of security statutes. He· described the
procedures under New Hampshire's legislation against subversion,95 and referred to various New Hampshire cases96 which, in
his opinion, supported the view that this legislation did not conflict
with federal statutes. A committee headed by the attorney general
of Massachusetts presented a report recommending that the
association in its fight against subversion set up a standing
committee to interchange information and ideas with the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.
At the 1955 conference Mr. Wyman declared that it was
"sheerest nonsense" to say that the federal government had the
exclusive right to investigate subversive activities within the
states. He was apprehensive of the possible influence "of the
smiles and blandishments of Communist diplomats." If this
resulted in "further curbing of the Federal security program," the
attorneys general of the states were to see to it that state security
programs were "not so susceptible to seduction."97
The association's committee on subversive activities recommended that each state set up a permanent division of subversive
activities in its state police system to cooperate with the local police
and the Federal Bureau· of Investigation.98 The association approved a resolution urging its members to take such action as they
deemed compatible with the interests of their own states in the
promotion of national security.99
Indeed, the attorneys general were not satisfied that the states
should have simply a share in the. struggle against subversion:
they wanted an immunity act which would protect witnesses in
state cases against the danger of federal prosecution. State prosecutors had complained that their investigations had been hampered b_y the fact that witnesses who might have given valuable
95 N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §§588.1 to 588.16 (Subversive Activities Act of 1951); N.H.
Laws 1953, c. 307, p. 524 at 525 (joint resolution directing the attorney general "to make
full and complete investigation with respect to violations of the subversive activities act
of 1951 and to determine whether subversive persons as defined in said act are presently
located within this state," and "to proceed with criminal prosecutions under the subversive activities act whenever evidence presented to him in the course of the investigation
indicates violations thereof," and "to report to the 1955 session on the first day of its regular session the results of this investigation, together with his recommendations, if any, for
necessary legislation'').
96 See, e.g., Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A. (2d) 756 (1954), sustaining the
validity of the legislation cited in the preceding note.
97 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1955, p. 23:1.
98Ibid.
99 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1955, p. 19:2-3.
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information under grant of state immunity were reluctant to do
so because of fears of federal prosecution. The attorneys general
after a sharp debate approved by a vote of 23 to 14 a resolution
for the enactment of a law that would grant immunity from
federal prosecution to witnesses who would receive immunity in
state cases involving subversion.100
It was at this conference that Attorney General Brownell
assured the attorneys general of the states that the department of
justice did not regard the country's internal security as the exclusive prerogative of the federal government. He advised them
that the government would take this position in its amicus curiae
brief in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, and added, "We believe that state
sedition laws should be enforced and that a full measure of
Federal-state cooperation will be in the public interest."101 The
following month the government filed its brief, in which it took
this position.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson and its denial of a petition for rehearing,102 the controversy which this decision raised has by no means come to an end.
The attorneys general of thirty-four states and the territory of
Alaska joined Pennsylvania in its petition for rehearing.103 Immediately after the Court's decision Representative Howard W.
Smith of Virginia, the principal draftsman of _the Smith Act, and
other members of Congress who were members in 1940 and voted
for it, publicly stated that they never intended supersession of
state laws.104 Congressman Smith called for a law which would
permit the states to proceed with prosecutions under their own
sedition laws. He had introduced a broad bill to cover this situation after the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.105
The Subversive Activities Liaison Committee of the National
Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution urging
amendatory legislation; and Senator Styles Bridges of New
Hampshire and later Congressman Walter introduced bills simi100 Id.

at col. 3.
at col. 1-2.
102 351 U.S. 934 (1956).
103 The states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin· and
Wyoming.
104 Petition for Rehearing, p. 4; N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 1956, p. 16: 6.
105 H.R. 3, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955).
101 Id.
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lar to, but more narrowly dra·wn than, Congressman Smith's bill.100
Senator Bridges' bill had the co-sponsorship of fourteen other
senators, eleven Republicans and three Democrats, and both bills
had the endorsement of the Department of Justice. Deputy Attorney General Rogers wrote to Senator James A. Eastland of
Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and to
Congressman Emanual Geller of New York, chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee:
"It is the view of the Department of Justice that in the
fields of sedition and subversion, the Federal and State
Governments can work together easily and well. . . . This
legislation would clearly express the congressional intent that
such cooperation between the Federal and State Governments
in this field is to be encouraged.
"The Department of Justice favors enactment of the
bill."101
The National Association of Attorneys General by a vote of
31 to 10 approved a resolution in favor of the "enactment of Federal legislation authorizing the enforcement of state statutes
prescribing criminal penalties for subversive activities involving
state or national governments or either of them"; 108 and t;he
Conference of Governors at its 48th annual meeting by what was
described as an almost unanimous vote adopted a resolution which
"recommended to the Congress that Federal laws should be so
framed that they will not be construed to pre-empt any field
against state action unless this intent is stated...." 109 The Senate
Judiciary Committee approved Senator Bridges' bill, and the
House Judiciary Committee Congressman Smith's bill,11° with an
amendment to make it identical with that of Congressman Walter,
but the Congress did not get to the passage of one of them. However, the opposition of the states to federal action which trespasses
106 S. 3617, H.R. 11341, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956); 102 CoNG. REc. 5473-5474 (April
11, 1956). The concern of many members of Congress over what they regard as federal
encroachment on the reserved powers of the states has resulted in the introduction of
some 70 measures affecting federal courts which have been referred to the Senate or
House Judiciary Committees. See N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1956, p. 25:1.
101 S. Rep. 2117, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 3 (1956); H.R. Rep. 2576, 84th Cong. 2d sess., 5
(1956). The fourteen senators who co-sponsored Senator Bridges' bill were Messrs. Martin
(Pa.), Cotton, Knowland, Daniel, Bricker, McClellan, Jenner, Welker, McCarthy, Stennis, Hruska, Saltonstall, Carlson and Potter.
108 N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1956, p. 19:2.
109 N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1956, p. 1:5, p. 20:6.
110 S. Rep. 2117, H.R. Rep. 2576, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956).
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on their reserved powers has been aroused, and their resistance
to such action will continue and probably even increase.
Moreover, the area covered by the new federal immunity act
is so large that it involves the police power of the states to a great
extent, and the Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that the
"intention of Congress to exclude States from exercising their
police power must be clearly manifested."111 If Congress intended
the new federal act to protect against the danger of state prosecution, it should have put that intent into express language. It did
not do so.
If one considers the state legislation in the area covered by the
new federal act, the prosecutions which have taken place under
this legislation, and the mounting determination on the part of
the states to be included in the struggle against subversion, one
cannot dismiss as lightly as either the Court or the district judge
did the point that if the federal act contains a prohibition against
state prosecutions it may then violate the Tenth Amendment,
which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." One can certainly
make a strong argument that subversion covers such a large area
that some of it is bound to be within the scope of reserved powers
beyond the reaeh of Congress. Indeed, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson
the Court specifically excluded from the scope of its opinion
sabotage, attempted violence of all kinds, and offenses under the
police power of the states.112 In Burns v. United States118 the
Court indicated that the punishment of those who intentionally
111 International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 al
253 (1949). For further illustrations see Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902). In Kelly v. Washington, the Court said, speaking through
Chief Justice Hughes (at 10): "The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal
action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is 'so direct and positive'
that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.' " In Reid v.
Colorado, the Court ruled (at 148): "It should never be held that Congress intends to
supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States,
even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested.''
In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), where the Court sustained the use of
wiretap evidence in a state court proceeding, the Court said (at 202-203): " ... If Congress
is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be
presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power
of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise
of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."
112 350 U.S. 493 at 500 (1956). See note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1952).
113 274 U.S. 328 at 331 (1927).
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destroyed or damaged the property of others was within the province of the states. Such destruction or damage is involved in either
sabotage or insurrection. In an early ~se, the Court, after adverting hypothetically to a local insurrection, stated: "In such cases the
State has inherently the right to· use all the means necessary to
put down the resistance to its authority, and restore peace, order,
and obedience to law."114 The states would likewise seem to have
the power to punish those who swore falsely under a state statute
requiring loyalty oaths of state employees or office holders,11 5 or
a municipal ordinance with a similar requirement.116
The Tenth Amendment point gains further support from the
fact that the prosecution of offenses is primarily the concern of
the states.11 7
Attorney General Wyman of New Hampshire in that state's
amicus curiae brief in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,11 8 joined by the
attorneys general of twenty-four other states, made the Tenth
Amendment his basis for asserting: "Congress lacks constitutional
power to supersede either expressly or by implication the States'
reserved right to make criminal within their border acts seeking
overthrow of their own government by force and violence."119
At the 1955 conference of the National Association of Attorneys
General he enlarged his position, and challenged the power of
Congress, under the Tenth Amendment, "to take from the states
their reserve power to seek to find out who within their borders
conspires to overthrow" either a state or the federal government.120
It is also relevant to observe that we are in a period of time
when there is an emphasis on states' rights. In August 1956 at the
79th annual meeting of the American Bar Association the dominant note in the welcoming speech of Governor Allan Shivers of
Texas and in the address of the association's president, E. Smythe
Gambrell, was that concentration of power in the federal government threatened to destroy states' rights. Governor Shivers welcomed the members of the association "to a state whose people
believe in the Tenth Amendment." Mr. Gambrell declared that
in the "clamor of controversy" over the first eight amendments
to the Constitution "our people seem to have overlooked the
114 White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 646 at 650-651 (1871).
115 See Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
116 See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
117 See notes 57-59 supra.
118 348 U.S. 814 (1954).
110 Brief, p. 16.
120 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1955, p. 23:1.
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Ninth and Tenth Amendments." 121 In the same month the
speakers at the Conference of Chief Justices, composed of the
highest judicial officers of the forty-eight states, took up the same
theme.122 In part this emphasis on states' rights may be the result
of the discussions which have been taking place about world government and the powers, if any, that international organizations
ought to have over national states. With national states seeking
to preserve their sovereignties the states within our federal union
have been stressing their reserved powers. And the pendulum has
been swinging toward them. For instance they won out on the
issue of ownership of tidelands oil.123 They may yet win by legislation on the issue involved in Pennsylvania v. N elson.124
With the states contending vigorously for their part in the
struggle against subversion, and with subversion covering a
territory so extensive that it includes such diverse items as injury
to property on the one hand and false loyalty oaths on the other,
it is difficult to see how the entire area constitutionally can be held
to be within the scope of a federal immunity act which prohibits
state prosecutions. In any event, since Congress deliberately left
the prohibition against prosecution ambiguous, the Court should
not have increased the prohibition to include state prosecution.
Judge Weinfeld was also of the opinion, relying on United
States v. M urdock,12 5 that the new federal act did not need to pro121 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1956, p. 1:4.
122 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1956, p. 13:1.
123 See Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat.

29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §§13011315; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
124 In the meantime, however, the highest courts of two states have invalidated state
sedition indictments. Braden v. Commonwealth, (Ky. 1956) 291 S.W. (2d) 843; Commonwealth v. Gilbert, (Mass. 1956) 134 N.E. (2d) 13. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hood, (Mass.
1956) 134 N.E. (2d) 12. State courts in Massachusetts quashed state sedition indictments
against a total of eight persons, including Prof. Dirk Struik, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology mathematician. N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1956, p. 6:1.
12:; 284 U.S. 141 (1931). In United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927), the Court, after holding that a claim of privilege had
not been made in that case, went on to say (at 113) that this conclusion made it unnecessary "to consider the extent to which the 5th Amendment guarantees immunity from
self-incrimination under state statutes.•.•"
A number of lower federal courts sustained a cl~im of privilege where the basis for
it was the danger of state prosecution. United States v. Lombardo, (W.D. Wash. 1915)
228 F. 980, affd. on another ground 241 U.S. 73 (1916); In re Gasteiger, (E.D.N.Y. 1923)
290 F. 410; In re Hooks Smelting Co., (E.D. Pa. 1905) 138 F. 954; In re Hess, (E.D. Pa. 1905)
134 F. 109; In re Kanter, (S.D.N.Y. 1902) 117 F. 356; In re Nachman, (D.C.S.C. 1902)
114 F. 995; In re Franklin Syndicate, (E.D.N.Y. 1900) 114 F. 205; In re Feldstein, (S.D.N.Y.
1900) 103 F. 269; In re Scott, (W.D. Pa. 1899) 95 F. 815; In re Graham, (S.D.N.Y.
1876) 10 Fed. Cas. 913, No. 5659; Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co., (D.C. Conn.
1913) 205 F. 827 at 829.
District Judge Woolsey in sustaining a claim of privilege in 1930, in In re Doyle,
(S.D.N.Y. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 686, made a careful review of the authorities, quoting the
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tect against the danger of state prosecution. It is submitted that
the Murdock case has come to be overestimated.
Under Counselman v. Hitchcock,12 6 a;n immunity act, to be
valid, must give a protection that is coextensive with the privilege
accorded -by the Fifth Amendment. This would seem to mean,
under our close-knit federal system, that a federal immunity act to
be constitutional would have to protect against prosecution under
state laws wherever the danger of such prosecution is of the same
substantiality as prosecution under federal laws. Our federal and
state governments are but parts of one integrated governmental
system. Taken together they form the government of one federal
state. It would therefore seem that a federal immunity act would
have to protect against the danger of state prosecution to the same
extent that it protects against the danger of federal prosecution.
A good illustration of the measure of protection that is necessary against federal prosecution may be found in Heike v. United
States.121 There the defendant pleaded in bar to an indictment
for frauds on the revenue the immunity provision in an act
aimed at the correction of certain corporate abuses. He had
previously testified in a grand jury investigation into possible
violations of the Sherman anti-trust act. During the course of
this testimony he had produced a table showing how many
pounds of sugar his company had melted during a certain period
of time. Some of this sugar was also involved in the fraud case.
But the Court held that the immunity provision did not protect
him, saying through Justice Holmes:
". . ; We see no reason for supposing that the act offered.
a gratuity to crime. It should be construed, s_o far as its words
fairly allow the construction, as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the privilege of the person concerned....
". . . When the statute speaks of testimony concerning a
matter it means concerning it in a substantial way, just as the
constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does
opinion in United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828), and two pertinent
paragraphs from Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906). However, he was reversed on
appeal, without opinion. United States v. Doyle, (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 1086. Shortly
after the decision on appeal the federal government nolleprossed an indictment against
Doyle. Comment, 41 YALE L. J. 618 at 622 (1932). The Doyle in this case was the same
one who was involved in Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
For a recent dictum in accord with Judge Weinfeld's opinion see George v. Lindberg,
(D.C. Minn. 1956) 138 F. Supp. 77 at 80.
126142 U.S. 547 (1892).
121 227 U.S. 131 '(1913).
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not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course
of law.... " 128
It would thus seem that a federal immunity provision should
extend this measure of protection against the danger not only
of federal but _also state prosecution. Indeed, such a formulation
will reconcile the results in all the Supreme Court cases as
well as most of the various statements in the opinions.
In two of the first cases dealing with the danger of state
prosecution the Supreme Court held that such a danger did
provide the basis for a claim of privilege. In one case, United
States v. Saline Bank,12° the opinion was by Chief Justice Marshall,
and in the other, Ballmann v. Fagin,130 by Justice Holmes. The
former case involved a creditors' bill for discovery and other
relief and a plea that the discovery would subject the defendants
to penalties under a Virginia statute which prohibited unincorporated banks. The Court sustained the plea: "The rule
clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery which
would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it."131
In the .latter case a claim of privilege included reliance on an
Ohio statute which made it a crime to operate a "bucket shop."
The Court ruled for the accused: "According to United States v.
Saline Bank ... he was exonerated from disclosures which would
have exposed him to the penalties of the state law."132
In the same term as Ballmann v. Fagin there were two decisions which have been taken as pointing in an opposite direction to that case. However, Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion in Ballmann v. Fagin, sat in both of those cases and dissented
in neither. One of them, Hale v. Henkel,13 3 did not involve the
problem at all: it held that an agent or officer of a corporation
may not claim the right of silence on its behalf.
The other, Jack v. Kansas,13 4 involving an immunity provision of an antitrust act of the state of Kansas, may be explained
128 Id. at 142, 144. In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917), the Court ruled
that a valid claim of privilege must be based on a real danger of prosecution.
120 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828).
130 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
1311 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 at 104 (1828).
132 200 U.S. 186 at 195 (1906). This statement has been called a dictum, United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 at 396 (1933); Melltzer, "Required Records, the McCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 18 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 687 at 688, n.
11 (1951); and apparently a dictum, United States v. DiCarlo, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 F.
Supp. 597 at 604. But it is submitted- that it is one of the alternative grounds of decision.
133 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
134 199 U.S. 372 (1905), affirming 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911 (1904).
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on the ground of the remoteness of the danger of federal prosecution. The state court, after pointing out that the inquiries in
that case were limited to intrastate transactions, and discussing
Brown v. Walker}3 5 concluded that the possibility that the defendant's answers might disclose violations of the federal antitrust law "was not a real and probable danger."136 The United
States Supreme Court agreed.
A little earlier, in Brown v. Walker, supra, the first federal
Supreme Court decision sustaining the constitutionality of an
immunity act, the Court, in answer to an objection that the federal
act there involved did not grant immunity from state prosecution,
stated:
"But even granting that there were still a bare possibility
that by his disclosure he might be subjected to the criminal
laws of some other sovereignty, that, as Chief Justice Cockburn said in Queen v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, in reply to the
argument that the witness was not protected by his pardon
against an impeachment by the House of Commons, is not
a real and probable danger, with reference to the ordinary
operations of the law in the ordinary courts, but 'a danger of
an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference
to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so
improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.' Such dangers it was never the object of the
provision to obviate.''137
Thus the law stood until United States v. Murdock, supra,
a case which has been regarded as establishing the proposition
that a federal immunity act need not protect against state prosecution. But that case, too, may be explained upon the ground that
there was no real danger of state prosecution. The· defendant
in each of two federal income tax returns had deducted $12,000
which he claimed to have paid to others. A revenue agent
wanted him to name the recipients. He declined and claimed
his privilege. That there was no real danger of state prosecution is indicated in this language of the Court: "The plea does
not rest upon any claim that the inquiries were being made to
discover evidence of crime against state law. Nothing of state
concern was involved. The investigation was under federal law
in respect of federal matters. The information sought ·was appro135 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
136 69 Kan. 387 at 405 (1904).
137 161 U.S. 591 at 608 (1896).
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priate to enable the Bureau to ascertain whether appellee had in
fact made deductible payments in each year as stated in his
return, and also to determine the tax liability of the recipients."138
However, the Court did say, among other things: "The
English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination,
on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment
rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in
violation of the laws of another country...." 139
But in neither of the two English cases which the Court
cited for this proposition was there any real danger of prosecution by any country. One of the cases, Queen v. Boyes,1 40 did
not involve another jurisdiction at all. There the defendant
took the position that a pardon from the Crown did not take
away the recipient's right of silence for the reason that it was
not pleadable to an impeachment by the House of Commons.
The court held against the defendant on the ground that the
danger of such an impeachment was imaginary and unsubstantial.
In the other case, King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox,14 1
agents of a revolutionary government in Sicily bought a vessel
in England and registered her in the name of two English
subjects. The king of the Two Sicilies brought a bill for discovery. The defendants, none of whom was in Sicily, pleaded
that their production of the requested documents would expose
them to criminal prosecution in Sicily. Again there was no
real danger of prosecution, and the court ruled against the defendants.
Today, for instance, if a witness in this country were to
claim a right of silence on the ground that his answer might
incriminate him in Russia, no court would pay any attention
to it. But if a witness before a congressional committee or a
federal court or grand jury were to claim his privilege on the
ground of substantial danger of state prosecution why should
his claim not be respected?
In the later English case of United States v. McRae142
188284 U.S. 141 at 149 (1931).
189Ibid.
HO 1 B. &: S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
m 19 L. J. (n.s.) (Ch.) 202 (1850), 20 L. J. (n.s.) (Ch.) 417 (1851), 7 St. Tr.
(n.s.) 1049 (1850-1851).
142 L.R. 4 Eq. 327 (1867), affirmed on the point of the claim of privilege, L.R. 3 Ch.
79 (1867). Cf. East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sr. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1749). But
see In re Atherton, [1912] 2 K.B. 251 at 253-254, a case arising out of the public examination of a bankrupt, an area in which the English courts have not given a due regard
to the right of silence.
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involving a bill for discovery by the United States against a
confederate agent, both the lower court and the Court of Appeal ,
in Chancery ruled for the defendant on the ground that to
compel him to make discovery might expose him to a forfeiture
in the United States, another international state. Both courts
distinguished King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, and restricted
any language in the opinion in that case to the actual holding.
Referring to that case, Lord Chancellor Chelmsford in the McRae
case said: "There it was not- she,;vn that the Defendants had
rendered themselves liable to criminal prosecution. . . . There
it was doubtful whether the Defendants would ever be within
the reach of a prosecution. . . ." 143 Indeed, it was the decision
in the McRae case which produced the second federal immunity
act, the act of 1868,144 later Rev. Stat., section 860. The English
law thus goes further than the position we are urging, for it
extends the protection of the privilege to cover the danger of
a prosecution or infliction of a penalty by a foreign state, whereas we are asking no more than that the privilege cover the danger,
and a substantial one, of a prosecution by another governmental unit of the same federal state.
After citing King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox and Queen
v. ·Boyes, the Court in the Murdock case went on to say that
immunity from state prosecution was not essential for the validity
of a federal immunity act and a lack of state power ·to protect
against federal prosecution did not defeat a state immunity
statute. For these propositions the Court cited Counselman v.
Hitchcock,145 Brown v. Walker, 146 Jack v. Kansas,14 1 and Hale
v. Henkel. 148 As we have already seen, in only two of these
cases, Brown v. ·Walker and Jack v. Kansas, was the problem
involved; and in both of these cases the danger of prosecution
by another jurisdiction was so remote that it was ·not entitled
to serious consideration.149
143 L.R. 3 Ch. 79 at 87 (1867).
144 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
145 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
146161 U.S. 591 (1896).
147 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
148201 U.S. 43 (1906).
149 Murdock was subsequently convicted, but his conviction was reversed for the
double reason that the judge in the circumstances of that case expressed an opinion as
to the defendant's guilt and refused to give a requested charge on willfulness.· United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933), affirming (7th Cir. 1932) 62 F. (2d) 926.
A good discussion of the problem presented in the Murdock case may be found in Grant,
"Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government,"
9 TEMP. L.Q. 57, 194 (1934-5).
·
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None of the counsel or the Court in the Murdock case as
much as cited the McRae case.1110 The quoted language in the
Murdock case was accordingly based on an inadequate presentation by counsel on both sides, and a misunderstanding of the
English law by the court.
Between the Murdock case and the· Ullman case there were
several Supreme Court decisions which did not show the regard
for the right of silence that one should wish,1111 but none is
inconsistent with the proposition that a federal immunity act,
to be valid, must give protection against the danger of state
prosecution wherever that danger is substantial. Indeed, this
proposition will reconcile the result in the Murdock case with
the results and opinions in the earlier Supreme Court cases.
The time has come for a reexamination of the opinion in
the Murdock case, and two federal courts, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit and the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, in recent cases have done just this. Both
cases involved claims of privilege before a subcommittee of the
Kefauver Committee. In both the real danger was not federal
but state prosecution. In both the court sustained the claim. In
both it reached for this result, in the one by going out of its
way to find a danger of federal prosecution and in the other by
stressing the fact that the investigation was into violations of
state law. In both the court relied on United States v. Saline
Bank1112 and Ballmann v. Fagin,1 113 and refused to apply the
Murdock case. In one of these two recent cases, Marcello v.
United States,1114 the defendant was asked whether he knew one
150 Although the government in its brief (at 15-16) quoted at length from the opinion
in King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, supra note 141, it in no way indicated that the
quoted language had been qualified and restricted in the later case of United States v.
McRae, supra note 142.
151 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (testimony given by a debtor in a
discovery proceeding in a state court in New York, most of which was given under a
limited immunity provision which simply forbade the use of such testimony in a subs·equent criminal proceeding against the debtor, held admissible against him in a federal
court on the trial of a mail fraud indictment); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953) (federal occupational tax on gamblers sustained as to persons in the states);
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (federal wagering tax stamp and documentary
evidence from federal internal revenue collector's office permitted in evidence in state
court criminal proceeding); Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955) (federal occupational tax on gamblers upheld as to persons in the District of Columbia); Regan v. New
York, 349 U.S. 58 (1955) (state criminal contempt conviction sustained because of broad
state immunity statute).
11121 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828).
111a 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
1114 (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437.
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Vitalli, who was supposed to be connected with a murder. The
·trial judge considered· the murder a state offense and ruled
against the defendant's claim of privilege. The court of appeals
·reversed, pointing out that the defendant might be confronted
with a charge of causing Vitalli to travel in interstate or foreign
commerce with intent to avoid prosecution. In the course of its
opinion the .court said:
" ... With much inconsistency, we may indulge the hope
that more state courts will follow the lead of the Supreme
Court of Michigan in the view that,
'It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one is not
subjected to self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a State judicial proceeding which testimony may
forthwith be used against him in a Federal criminal prosecution.' . . .."11:; 5
In the other recent case, United States v. DiCarlo,1 56 the
court after discussing United States v. Saline Bank, with a quotation of the opinion in extenso, and Ballmann v. Fagin, with a
pertinent quotation, continued:
·
"Thus, in cases decided before United States v. Murdock,
supra, two of the most illustrious jurists ever to sit upon the
Supreme Court, speaking for the court, recognized the privilege of the witness and of parties in a federal proceeding, to
immunity against disclosures that would expose them to the
danger of state prosecutions; and in the only Supreme Court
decision relied upon by the government the court made
special note of the absence of any matter of 'state concern.' " 157
Law review comment generally has been favorable to the
Di Carlo decision.158
Reference may also be made to the fact that a number of
state court decisions have extended the protection of the right
of silence to the danger of prosecutions in other jurisdictions,
1115 Id. at 443.
156 (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 F. Supp. 597.
157 Id. at 604.
158 See, e.g., notes 22 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 193 (1953); 26 TEMP. L. Q. 64 (1952); 66
HARv. L. REv. 185 (1952); 31 TEX. L. REv. 433 (1953). Contra: comment, 4 STAN. L. R.Ev.
594 (1952). The first writer stated: "The DiCarlo case is a step fonvard in protecting
the individual citizen from any arbitrary encroachments by one of the government's
many investigating committees, at least where the investigation is directly aimed at
violation of state laws." 22 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 193 at 204. The second writer said:
"The DiCarlo case well illustrates the fallacy of the two sovereignties theory." 26 TEMP.
L Q. 64 at 69.
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wherever that danger has been substantial.159 The Michigan
Supreme Court, in In re Watson/ 60 after a careful consideration of the authorities rejected the opinion in the Murdock
case, and stated:
"We believe that this ancient privilege should be maintained against limitations that we conceive tend to make it
ineffectual, futile, and subversive of the spirit and letter of
the Bill of Rights. Under our Federal system of government,.
with co-extensive jurisdiction of State and national government, a person subject to the laws of a State is, at the same
time, subject to the laws of the Federal government. A citizen
of a State is a citizen of the United States.... After a review
of the authorities and a consideration of the constitutional
provisions and the principles involved, we are of the opinion
that the privilege against self-incrimination exonerates from
disclosure whenever there is a probability of prosecution in
State or Federal jurisdictions....
"To overcome the privilege, the extent of the immunity
would have to be of such a nature that it would protect, not
only against State prosecution, but also against any reasonably
probable Federal prosecution. The claim of the privilege in
the face of a State immunity statute cannot be used as a subterfuge or pretense to refuse to answer in proceedings to detect or suppress crime. But neither can the grant be used to
compel answers that will lead straight to Federal prosecution.
Whenever the danger of prosecution for a Federal offense is
substantial and imminent as a result of disclosures to be made
under a grant of immunity by the State, such immunity is
insufficient to overcome the privilege against self-incrimination.''161
The court's opm1on in a recent Michigan case, People v. Den
Uyl,162 termed the restriction of the privilege accorded by a
state to exclude federal prosecutions "a travesty on verity."163
1119 See, e.g., State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 283, 82 S. (2d) 12 (1955); State v. Doran,
215 La. 151, 39 S. (2d) 894 (1949); People v. Hoffa, 318 Mich. 656, 29 N.W. (2d) 292
(1947); People v. DenUyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W. (2d) 284 (1947); In re Watson, 293
Mich. 263 at 284-286, 291 N.W. 652 (1940); Frad v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 178
Misc. 705, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 250 (1941), affd. without opinion, 264 App. Div. 836, 35 N.Y.S.
(2d) 756, motion for leave to appeal denied, 264 App: Div. 853, 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 178 (1942).
Contra, State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E. (2d) 104 (1956).
160 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940).
161 Id. at 284-286.
162 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W. (2d) 284 (1947).
163 Id. at 651.
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This language was quoted with approval in Marcello v. United
States. 164
In Matter of Doyle,16 5 a case arising out of an investigation
by a joint committee of the legislature into bribery of public
officials in the city_ of New York, the New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Cardozo, "put aside as
remote and unsubstantial the supposed peril of exposure to
prosecution for the making of false tax returns to State or Federal
officers."166 Many, if not most, of the state cases which have
denied a claim of privilege where it was based on the danger
of a prosecution by another jurisdiction can be explained on
the ground that the danger of such prosecution was too remote
to be given serious consideration.167 Wherever danger of prosecution by another jurisdiction, at least within our own federal
system is substantial, the danger should furnish a sufficient
basis for a claim of privilege. That the danger of state prosecution in the area covered by the new federal act is substantial
we have already abundantly s~en.

[To be concluded.]
164 (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437 at 443.
165 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
166 Id. at 267.
167 See, e.g., Lorenzo v. Blackbum, (Fla. 1954)

·
74 S. (2d) 289; State v. Kelly, (Fla.
1954) 71 S. (2d) 887; People v. Butler Street Foundry, 201 Ill. 236, 66. N.E. 349 (1903);
Koa1;ck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W. (2d) 269 (1952); Republic of Greece v.
Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 345 (1928) (foreign state); In re Cohen, 295 Mich.
748, 295 N.W. 481 (1940); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295 N.W. 483 (1940); In re
Schnitzer, 295 Mich. 736, 295 N.W. 478 (1940); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A. (2d) 176
(1952); State v. March, 46 N.C. •526 (1854); In re Greenleaf, 176 Misc. 566, 28 N.Y.S.
(2d) 28 (1941), affd. 266 App. Div. 658, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 209, affd. 291 N.Y. 690, 52 N.E.
(2d) 588 (1943); In re Cappeau, 198 App. Div. 357, 190 N.Y.S. 452 (1921); In re Werner,
167. App. Div. 384, 152 N.Y.S. 862 (1915); Matter of Herlands (Carchietta), 204 Misc. 373,
124 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1953); Ex parte Copeland, 91 Tex. Cr. 549, 240 S.W. 314 (1922);
State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 A. 697 (1926). In People y. Butler Street Foundry, supra,
the court said (at 252): "But if it be conceded that there is a bare possibility tha.t ~e
affidavit might contain disclosures which would furnish evidence of a violation of the
Anti-trust statute of some other State of the Union or of the United States, we think,
within the meaning of the authorities, that such disclosure is not a real and probable
danger, and does not fall within the danger which the constitutional privilege was in•
·tended to obviate." In Ex parte Copeland, supra, the court ruled (at 559): "The further
reason urged that relator should not answer the questions because the State court and
district attorney had no right to guarantee immunity from Federal prosecution has such
a shadowy and µncertain basis that we scarcely deem. it necessary to discuss it." In Gould
v. Gould, 201 App. Div. 674, 194 N.Y.S. 742 (1922), prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction
had already been concluded.
·

